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Abstract: Privatisation of electricity has been extensive both in the developed and the 
developing world. Failures in various areas have led to the emergence of a new consensus 
which regards competitive pressures and regulation as crucial for utility privatisations to 
work. This review paper presents a critical evaluation of this newly found wisdom with 
reference to the developing economies. The experience in the developed world, especially 
in the US and the UK, has been used to draw conclusions for the developing economies. 
Overall, the paper highlights the problems associated with the ‗competitive model‘ both in 
the developed and developing world and points to the potential instability in private 
competitive power supply systems. It also examines the degree to which regulation can be a 
panacea for market failures and structural problems under private provision. 
 
 
 
 
Note: An updated version of this paper can be found in Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Change, 2009, Vol. 80, No 4, pp. 641-664    
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1. Introduction  
 
Like many other sectors, the electricity industry has been subject to widespread 
privatisation both in developed and developing countries. In the developing world, the 
inability of governments to maintain and extend infrastructure during the fiscal crisis in the 
1970s and 1980s provided the ideal conditions for arguments against public ownership to 
gain a stronghold position. Indeed, public electricity utilities in many countries suffered 
from poor revenue collection, high technical losses, decaying networks and high costs of 
operation. The coercion associated with policy conditional lending by the IMF and the 
World Bank under these conditions facilitated the proliferation of privatisation projects. 
Soon, policy advice was standardised into ‗templates‘ to be used in all countries with 
diverse conditions (Yi Chong, 2005). For electricity the prescription involved ‗vertical 
unbundling‘.  
 The naïve views of the earlier years have evolved to recognise the complexities 
associated with privatisation and admitted that there is no universally applicable blueprint 
for utility sector reforms. The importance of competition and regulation are now 
emphasized for success after privatisation (Bortolotti and Perotti 2007, Newberry 2004, 
Estache et al 2005). Similar reflections were also aired by the World Bank over its 
privatisation drive in infrastructure in a landmark publication on reforming infrastructure 
(Kessides 2004). A thorough review of the changing views on utility sector reforms since 
the 1980s and the new wisdom can be found in Bayliss and Fine (2007). 
 This paper examines the credibility of the new consensus that privatisation of 
electricity is effective so long as markets are regulated. It draws conclusions for developing 
countries from the experiences in the developed country markets, especially, the US and the 
UK. In the next section, it shows that competition remains highly imperfect even in market 
segments where it has been considered feasible. Investment requirements and associated 
risks appear significant in impeding the level of competition in the electricity sector. The 
concept of ‗regulatory effectiveness‘ is discussed in section 3. It is argued that the limited 
literature on regulatory effectiveness in developing countries failed to open the ‗black box‘. 
The dynamic aspects of regulatory effectiveness are ignored and capacity development is 
perceived as a mechanical process.  
 
2. Privatisation and competition: The rhetoric and reality in the electricity markets 
 
Until the 1980s, vertical integration, mostly under public ownership, was favoured for 
the power sector because it was considered a natural monopoly with sunk costs, inelastic 
demand and co-ordination problems in generation, transmission and distribution. After the 
rise of neo-liberal thinking, this model was criticised for its inefficiency and tendency to 
create excess capacity. It has been argued that the rationale for integrated power supply 
under public ownership has been weakened because of technological developments 
(Jamasb, et al 2005). For example, lower investment costs with combined cycle turbines 
increased new entries and developments in information technology improved co-ordination 
within different segments of the industry. In particular, the generation sector was 
highlighted for its potential to be competitive.  
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The pioneers in privatisation and deregulation of the electricity sector have been the UK 
Chile and Argentina. The reform process was gradually standardised for application 
elsewhere. The prescription often involved unbundling of generation, transmission, 
wholesale and retail distribution with the introduction of some form of competition in all 
segments of the market except for transmission. The Appendix Table at the end of this 
article shows various aspects of power sector liberalisation for 42 countries from different 
regions in the world. Even though close to sixty per cent of countries included in this 
sample have adopted some form of unbundling in their electricity markets, only around 
one-third have opened their retail supply to competition. In other words, in most countries 
distribution is not separated from retail supply. Three quarters of countries with retail 
market competition achieved some level of supplier switching by consumers but mostly by 
large users. Belgium, Netherlands and the UK are the only countries with a significant level 
of switching by small users. Contradicting with this, however, is the extensive market 
concentration in most countries. More than three-quarters of countries for which data was 
available had their generation and supply markets controlled by three companies. Even 
higher levels of concentration prevail for the retail market. 
Western European countries included in the Appendix Table are most advanced in 
opening up their electricity markets. Most of them have been deregulating their electricity 
industries to comply with the European Union Directives for liberalisation of energy 
markets since 1996. But deeper deregulation did not seem to have enhanced the competitive 
pressures as both the generation and supply markets are highly concentrated in many 
European countries. In South America, too, a considerable degree of opening is observed in 
generation. But for most other countries in the rest of the world market liberalisation has 
been limited with private entry into generation sector, especially, by independent power 
producers (IPPs).  
While full market opening has been limited in many developing countries, most are 
resolved to continue with further deregulation to improve the performance in the power 
industry. What light does the extensive experience of some countries with the privatisation 
and liberalisation of power markets shed on the prospects for the followers? What lessons 
can developing countries learn from the West?   
In Western Europe, the UK has one of most liberalised and competitive power market. 
It is entirely privatised with full retail market opening and considerable switching both by 
large and small users. In North America, the US has had comparable levels of power 
market deregulation in many of its states.
1
   
The experience in the North especially in the US and the UK for over a decade points to 
the instability of ‗the competitive model‘ in which prices are expected to equal the marginal 
cost of supply. Firstly, the evidence shows that an increase in the number of new entrants is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for competitive outcomes in a market with 
characteristics of the power sector. Prices reflecting marginal costs can be imposed in a 
heavily concentrated market. Similarly, prices can be far above the marginal cost of supply 
in a less concentrated private power industry. Sweeting (2007) demonstrates this in the case 
of the UK where wholesale electricity prices were close to the marginal cost of supply 
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 It is difficult to summarise the extent of deregulation for the US electricity markets as a whole in the 
Appendix Table as market structures vary greatly from one state to another. Aggregation in the presence of 
such differences is not possible. 
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when the generation industry had a duopoly during 1995-1996, while they were above the 
marginal cost at a time when the market was much less concentrated following new 
entrants to the generation sector either because of the exercise of market power or collusion 
under capacity shortages.  
Secondly, after the daunting failures in places like California, Alberta and Ontario 
during 2001-2003 (Woo et al. 2003) it is being increasingly recognised that privatised and 
deregulated power industries are more susceptible to failures if capacity constraints are 
pressing (Smith 2002, Borenstein 2002). In particular, the case of California, where the 
wholesale electricity prices more than quadrupled from 1999 to 2001, has been studied 
extensively. Use and abuse of market power is considerable in general but worse under 
capacity shortages (Jaskow 2001, Kelly 2003, Hansen 2005). These defects, if combined 
with tight input supply (e.g. low rainfall, fuel supply problems), fast growing demand and 
extreme weather during peak periods, can be a recipe for a catastrophe.    
The most pressing problem is that ‗the competitive model‘ failed in providing 
‗incentives‘ for investment in generation (Jaskow 2003, von Hirschhausen et al.  2004). 
There are two reasons for this. The first of these is related to the fact that customers can 
switch suppliers which create substantial investment risks and uncertainty for private 
investors. The second is related to a paradox of the ‗competitive market‘ paradigm in that 
capacity shortages in the power sector push prices far above the marginal cost of supply 
while excess capacity lowers prices to levels that fall short of recovering investment costs 
(Lave et al. 2004, Reeder 2006). Hence, capacity shortage is desirable for the operators as it 
increases their profitability and power in the market but detrimental for consumers and the 
reliability of supply.  
Reflections upon these failures in the developed world have led proponents to rethink 
the pre-conditions for privatisation and deregulation and to improve ‗the market design‘. 
Proposals have included making use of long term contracts (Jaskow 2003, Neuho and De 
Vries 2004) and capacity obligations or payments (Besser, et al. 2002, Stauffer 2006), 
introduction of ‗real-time-pricing‘ (RTP) to achieve some responsiveness on the demand 
side to changing prices (Borenstein 2002, Kelly 2003), use of ‗locational prices‘ for 
transmission (Green 2004, Turvey 2006) and changes in the mandate and responsibilities of 
the regulatory institutions (Newberry 2002). 
Nevertheless, these solutions are not free from problems. Meters for RTP are costly, 
thus only worthwhile for large industrial power consumers. But because RTP requires more 
attention to risks (O‘Sheasy, 2002) not many large consumers retain it (Barbose et al. 
2006). Those remaining on RTP reduce their demand for power only when there are 
extraordinary increases in prices and by a small proportion (Hopper et al 2006). Locational 
pricing is considered as an ineffective exercise due its complexity and high start up costs 
(Kelly 2003). Use of long-term contracts and capacity payments are against the paradigm of 
‗competitive markets‘ as they would reduce the effectiveness of price signals in regulating 
demand and supply. The incentives for operators and retailers to engage in long-term 
contracts are limited, since end users can switch their suppliers (Roques et al. 2005).  
As a consequence of the difficulty of recovering investment costs in the power sector 
the number of mergers has increased substantially over the last decade. Market 
concentration has increased in the European Union (EU 2004). This process has been 
particularly noteworthy in the UK since the New Electricity Trading Agreements (NETA) 
replaced ‗the pool‘ (Newberry, 2004). The German power industry has become more 
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concentrated following the liberalisation (Brunekreeft and Twelemann 2005). In the US, 56 
mergers took place amongst power utilities between 1990 and 2000 (Moody 2004), and 
financial institutions seem to be ‗urging‘ regulators not to prohibit takeovers of financially 
distressed generators to increase investments even if it comes at the cost of lower 
competition in the sector (Kelly and Moody 2005). In the developing world too, the 
unbundled power sectors are being re-integrated in some countries (Wamukonya 2003). In 
countries where there are many suppliers, a few dominate the market. In Chile, for 
example, three generators own 94 per cent of the installed capacity (del Sol 2002).  
 In sum, the evidence suggests that competition in the power sector has been 
impracticable with ambiguous long-term benefits in the advanced industrial economies.  
The integrated model under public or regulated private ownership in the North is now being 
praised for its reliable supply, low prices and universal access (Hunt 2002, Yi Chong 2005). 
Advocates are now more critical of the prospects after privatisation and deregulation.  
―…there is as yet insufficient experience to assess the long-term benefits 
from liberalising the electricity industry. As the first countries to liberalise 
–among which are included Britain and some U.S. states– have now 
reached the end of their first investment cycle, much attention is being paid 
to assessing the long-term dynamic performance of the liberalised 
electricity industry‖ (Roques, et al. 2005, p. 122 )  
Intuition would suggest that it must be harder for similar reforms to work well in 
developing economies. Indeed, the list of pre-conditions for the feasibility of privatisation 
and deregulation is longer for developing economies, including the need for sufficient 
production capacity, a viable network size, effective regulation, administrative capability 
and a strong institutional environment (Navarro and Shames 2003, Kessides 2004, Jamasb 
et al. 2005, Hansen 2005).  
‘In many LDCs, electrification is not complete... There is a system size 
below which vertical separation and competition is not effective or not 
worthwhile... Losses in the transmission and distribution networks are high. 
Non-payment is high. Capacity shortages, poor utilisation of existing 
capacity and unserved demand result in significant economic 
loss…Regulatory credibility, institutional weaknesses and political 
interference are more important drivers of private investment in the sector 
than in developed countries‘. (Jamasb, et al. 2005) 
By the time economists recognised the loopholes in neo-liberal power sector reforms, 
many developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America had already divested some of 
their existing plants and introduced private operators though independent power producers 
(IPPs). The IPPs have been trying to reduce their own risks in a number of ways at the cost 
of higher risks for governments and society at large.  
In fact, most developing economies have not tried ‗competition‘ or ‗regulated 
competition‘ in power generation as in the US or the UK. Instead, the prospects for 
competition are circumvented from the beginning through the use of power purchase 
agreements (PPAs) between the governments and the IPPs, spanning 20-30 years, involving 
onerous conditions such as fixed prices, foreign currency indexing and ‗take or pay‘ 
agreements. In Tanzania, for example, power sector reforms increased government 
transfers to the energy sector because of capacity and energy payment obligations to two 
major IPPs (Eberdhardt, et al 2005). For this or other reasons, contractual disputes and 
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renegotiations are on the rise.  In Latin America, for example, 21 per cent of all contracts in 
the power sector have been renegotiated on average within 2.1 years after being signed 
(Guasch, 2007). 
Moreover, the fixation on privatisation has meant that large scale projects such as 
hydropower had to be abandoned in favour of the new technologies employed by IPPs, 
such as combined cycle turbines. Cheaper and cleaner generation with hydro plants are 
unattractive for private investors because recovering investment costs takes much longer 
and financing investments is more difficult.  While start-up costs are lower with new 
technologies, the marginal cost of generation is often higher than conventional hydro units 
(Briscoe 1999, Wamukonya 2003). This is why in countries like Ghana tariffs increased 
steeply after the introduction of thermal generation with IPPs (Eberdhardt, et al 2005).  
IPPs frequently finance their investments with loans from international markets but 
governments often act as full or partial guarantors for these loans and their obligations can 
be activated in times of crisis. Multilateral institutions provide loans to governments to pay 
for management fees or undertake investments and renovation before or after privatisation 
to attract private investors, etc. These practices raise concerns as to why the utility rents 
should be appropriated by private firms when risks are increasingly being shouldered by 
governments and tax payers. 
The issues raised above have important implications for electricity prices and their 
affordability in the developing world. It is now clearer that policy makers in the developing 
world disregarded the importance of designing tariff structures for the affordability of 
services during the process of restructuring and privatisation (Estache 2006). For example, 
electricity tariffs were raised substantially following privatisation or restructuring in most 
African economies (Eberdthart et al, 2005). In some cases, tariff hikes were politically 
difficult to implement. In Argentina, wholesale electricity prices were halved but the cost of 
distribution increased, so households paid more for power (Haselip, 2005).  
 
Figure 1. Real Electricity Prices in OECD and in the UK: 1978-2008
Source: International Energy Association Energy Price Statistics 
 
In the North, prices declined initially but rose again later. In fact, as shown in Figure 1, 
real electricity prices in the OECD countries started declining from the mid 1980s onwards 
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when the extent of power market deregulation was limited. After 2000, when some market 
opening was already underway prices started to increase.  
In the UK, prices were on a declining trend from the early 1980s onwards, a decade 
before privatisation and liberalisation.  This trend was maintained after privatisation and 
deregulation in the 1990s as a result of restructuring, new investments that generated ‗dash 
for cheaper gas‘ and price-cap regulation (Pollitt 2005). Recently, though, they have been 
on the rise because of the downturn in investments, increasing fuel prices, lack of 
diversification in generation (rising dependence on gas) and higher emission charges. In the 
US, deregulation has had no affect on power prices in the long-term except for some 
mandated cuts in domestic tariffs (Lave et al. 2004). Therefore, short-term results can be 
misleading. What matters is the sustainability of affordable prices for essential services in 
the long term.  
 
3. Effectiveness of Regulation  
 
Mainstream economic theory suggests public ownership for natural monopolies and for 
firms that produce goods and services with externalities or public good characteristics in 
order to tackle market failures. The advent of property rights and public choice theories 
swung the pendulum in favour of private ownership by underlining government failures 
such as rent-seeking and lack of incentives for innovation. Regulation is seen as a remedy 
for market failures in non-competitive sectors.
2
  
This rhetoric has increasingly been influential. Many countries in both the developed 
and developing world have now have a regulatory establishment, overseeing the power 
sector developments as shown in the Appendix Table at the end of this paper. Overall, what 
it shows is that regulatory map of the world varies enormously.  Most countries have a 
regulatory body in the power sector, two-third of them with jurisdical independence. 
However, this basic categorisation hides many complexities in the process of regulation.  
In some countries one regulatory institution is responsible for other utilities such as gas, 
water and telecom as well as electricity (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Colombia, Ghana)  while 
in others there is a unique regulatory set up for power sector alone (e.g. the UK, France, 
Portugal, India, Pakistan, Argentina, Kenya, South Africa). The mandate of the regulators 
differs considerably from country to country, too. In some, they might be responsible for a 
small range of activities such as price regulation as in Kenya, while in others they might 
have wider responsibilities such as policy making in the electricity industry, including the 
design of market structure and implementation of deregulation process as in Germany, the 
UK, Argentina, Chile, South Africa. Similarly, while a considerable number of regulatory 
bodies are established as ‗independent‘ institutions, the degree of independence in practice 
varies considerably. In many countries, regulators either face direct interventions by the 
government on an ad hoc  basis or continually operate under the influence of governments 
despite their legally independent status. Dubash and Rao (2008), for example, describe the 
circumstances in this respect for India. Similar views are expressed for Kenya (ABS, 2006) 
and Ghana (Bayliss and Fine, 2007). 
                                                 
2
 See, Florio (2006) for an in depth discussion of the evolution of the theoretical perspectives on ownership 
and company performance. 
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Neither are the details outlined above sufficient for the assessment of regulatory 
effectiveness in general or in specific circumstances. Three issues are crucial for the 
effectiveness of regulation. The first is the regulatory capacity which is contingent upon the 
powers assigned and resources available to the regulatory institution (including funding, 
education, skills and experience of personnel such as accountants, lawyers, inspectors, 
engineers with good remuneration).  
The second is the institutional environment in which regulators operate. The existence 
of regulatory institutions with appropriate tools, powers and capacity is not sufficient. 
Outside the regulatory bodies, culture, politics and social context play a significant role in 
general and in the nature of ‗commitments‘ and ‗credibilities‘ of the contracting parties in 
particular. The legal system, dispute settlement mechanisms, efficient administration of 
regulatory matters by public institutions, corruption and bankruptcy procedures are some 
other factors that influence the effectiveness of regulation.   
The third is the possibility of regulatory capture through which private interest groups 
influence the way the regulatory process is designed and implemented so as to appropriate 
utility rents to the detriment of ‗the public interest‘ with socially non-optimal outcomes 
(Stigler 1971). 
The evidence shows that the degree of regulatory effectiveness varies from country to 
country. Generally, however, serious weaknesses are identified in the regulatory objectives, 
processes, capacity and institutional environment in developing countries (Bell 2003, 
Parker and Kirkpatrick 2004, Minogue and Cariño 2006). There are cases in which utility 
privatisations have been carried out without a regulatory institution or with one functioning 
as window display. There are also concerns that social stratification involving clan systems, 
tribal divisions and other forms of relationship contracting in developing world can 
reinforce ‗regulatory capture‘ (Parker and Kirkpatrick 2004). 
While it is possible for developing economies to build an effective regulatory system 
and capacity over time, the nature of this development process is very much a ‗black box‘ 
in the development literature on the privatisation of utilities. The dynamic aspects of 
regulatory effectiveness are ignored. Capacity development perceived as a mechanical 
process as if it is a matter of adapting the ‗best‘ regulatory tools –often developed 
elsewhere– and as if there is an ultimate ideal regulatory entity that needs to be built to 
tackle the market failures. For example Cubbin and Stern (2006) suggest that it takes on 
average 14 years to build up a regulatory capacity with maximum impact.  The data in the 
Appendix Table suggest that that two-thirds of the countries considered have had 10 years 
or less experience with the regulation of electricity markets. Out of 38 countries for which 
data was available, only five countries have had 14 years or more practice in power sector 
regulation. 
Moreover, the performance of regulatory entities is often ‗second best‘ even in pioneer 
countries like the US and the UK with long years of know-how in the sector. They learn 
their ‗trade‘ along the way. Responses to emerging problems are hardly ever simultaneous. 
Improvements on one front reveal weaknesses on other fronts.  
For example, most regulators have used ‗cost-plus‘ (or rate of return) regulation in the 
early years which led to over investment and revealed considerable inefficiencies in 
containing costs (Berg and Lin 2005, Menard and Clarke 2002a). As a result, there has been 
a shift towards ‗price-cap‘ regulation (Politt 2005), which is about to be discarded in favour 
of more ‗hybrid regimes‘ (Estache et al 2005) because of its disincentive effects for 
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investment. The financial crises in Asia and Argentina revealed other contingencies such as 
indebtedness of companies which can also become subject to regulation (Corria da Silva, et 
al. 2006).  
 Regulatory inefficiencies have distributional consequences. Intertemporal loopholes 
until the regulators take corrective measures create winners and losers. For example, gains 
after privatisation have either been captured by companies or the government in Argentina 
because regulator‘s price caps initially underestimated the cost savings. In the UK, the 
benefits of higher productivity in infrastructure were not always shared with consumers 
(Price and Young 2003).  
Overall, as pointed out by von Hirschhausen et al. (2004) ‘regulation is a repeated 
game between the regulator and the regulated enterprise‘. The outcomes of this game are 
dependent upon myriad number of economic, social, political and technical factors. The 
time lags in the responsiveness of regulators can have significant social costs, which in the 
case of developing countries are likely to be substantial. Other development goals such as 
industrialisation depends on energy policies and hence independent regulation of electricity 
industry may present some incongruence in some cases which may lead to circumstances in 
which regulators are undermined by political processes or broader development goals are 
sacrificed for the principle of regulatory independence.    
 From, a theoretical point of view, the agency theory (Sappington and Stiglitz 1987) and 
incomplete contracts framework (Hart et al. 1997, Hart 2003, Martimort 2006) made 
important contributions, which are particularly relevant for the debate on utility 
privatisations. A balanced interpretation of these perspectives indicates that there is no 
prima facie case for the superiority of one form of ownership over the other. Rather, the 
outcomes of privatisation are contingent upon various other factors (e.g. sector specific 
factors, competing objectives, information asymmetries between different agents, the 
hazards of contract incompleteness and incentives under different ownership).  
 The problems associated with asymmetric information and incompleteness of contracts 
between different agents (especially the state, regulators and private operators) are inherent 
in most private utilities, including electricity. These cannot be entirely and permanently 
solved by regulation or other corrective policy measures. For example, in the power sector, 
regulators could not distinguish between the exercise of market power and scarcity rent 
(Fraser, 2003) when price hikes are allowed to signal capacity shortages. Legal battles and 
renegotiations with private electricity companies highlight the dangers associated with 
‗contract incompleteness‘ in utility concessions. Various factors are considered in the 
literature for the renegotiation of concession contracts in the utilities. For example, high 
transaction costs in contracting out services on a long term basis (Ng and Loosemore 2007) 
act as deterrents for governments to cancel contracts in case of contractual disputes. This is 
a source of opportunism for operators in that they can place the most attractive bid and 
request renegotiation after contracts are signed. These costs may multiply several times in 
cases where renegotiation of contracts takes place due to the contingencies over the life of 
the contract. Opportunism by governments or firms (Parker and Kirkpatrick 2004), 
manipulation by private companies, external shocks, underestimation of the costs of 
business (Bell 2003), weaknesses in contract design, quality of administration and 
regulation and elections (Guasch et al. 2006) are also mentioned in the literature.  
 Such disputes and renegotiations have been common in the developing world. For 
example, following the crisis in Argentina and abandonment of the US dollar denominated 
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and indexed tariffs, 62 public services contracts went to the World Bank's International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes and close to half of them have been in the 
power sector  (Haselip 2005). In Maharashtra (India), a new government reviewed the 
contract with Dabhol power company and decided that it favoured the interest of the private 
company over those of the people. As a result of non-payment by the State Electricity 
Board a legal battle started (Parker and Kirkpatrick 2004). In Latin America, more than half 
of the concession contracts during 1988-2004 involving the private sector in infrastructure 
have been renegotiated in less than two years after the contracts were signed (Guasch et al. 
2006 and Guasch 2007). 
 Finally, while the ‗agency theory‘ and ‗incomplete contracts framework‘ are highly 
relevant for the analysis of regulatory effectiveness they have several weaknesses. They are 
based on a relatively simple agency framework, often with one principal and one agent. In 
reality, agency composition in the delivery of services like water and electricity is much 
more complex with multiple principals and agents, each with potentially different 
objectives and interests (e.g. ministers as agents of electors but principals as service 
providers, the poor as consumers and voters, regulators as agents of governments, foreign 
and local managers of private companies with mixed ownership, company shareholders). 
Moreover, both of these approaches focus on the microeconomic aspects of ownership 
changes, especially on the performance of companies like other theories (e.g. public choice, 
property rights) and have very little to say on the political economy aspects of utility 
privatisation, including inequality, poverty, affordability and the lack of access to services, 
which are pressing problems in the developing world. Of particular relevance for 
developing economies is the role of regulation in poverty alleviation which has not been 
discussed in detail so far as pointed out by Figueira-Theodorakopoulou et al. (2007).  On 
the whole, the tension after privatisation between profit maximisation and extension of 
services, or the affordability of services, is not only an economic one but also a political 
one.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper provides a review of developments in the privatisation of electricity industry 
and questions the superiority of the ‗private model‘ for developing countries. It shows that 
the theoretical and empirical validity of the assertion that privatisation enhances 
competition and hence efficiency remains dubious. Competition in the electricity sector has 
remained highly imperfect even in the segments of the market where it has been considered 
feasible. Problems of market power have been identified in countries such as the UK and 
the US, which are most advanced in the implementation of power sector reforms. Market 
concentration has been increasing in the sector. The goal of efficient supply with affordable 
services and reasonable profits has been threatened by the difficulty of providing optimal 
incentives for investment in the sector. In the developing world, competition has been 
impracticable from the start through the use of power purchasing agreements. Increasingly, 
the public sector is involved in private projects to undertake or share the risks that the 
private sector is unwilling to take on.  
  It also argues that the emphasis in the recent literature on regulation as ‗the cure‘ for 
market failures after privatisation is problematic in some respects. Regulatory effectiveness, 
however defined, requires regulatory capacity, which continues to evolve even in the 
developed countries and remains far from ‗the ideal‘. In the presence of information 
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asymmetries, incomplete contracts and future uncertainties, our perception of what that 
ideal may be is vague. The response to emerging problems is piecemeal, partial and not 
simultaneous. Developing regulatory capacity in the South with a mechanistic view of 
institutional and procedural replication is fraught with difficulties. Regulatory weaknesses, 
whether structural or transitory, have distributional consequences.   
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Appendix Table - The Extent of Liberalisation in the World Electricity Markets - Selected Countries 
 
Unbun
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No of 
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dent Ss 
No 
of 
Ss 
Top 3 
Ss 
Share 
R  
exists? 
R 
indepen
dent? 
Years 
R 
exists 
large 
users 
small 
users 
WESTERN EUROPE 
Austria  yes 20 100 5 22 3 75 3 133 19 144 67% yes yes 7 
Belgium  yes 20 90 5 35 19 95 1 27 17 41 90% yes yes 8 
France  yes 3 70 6 22 0 95 1 166 15 25 88 yes yes 8 
Germany  yes 20 100 8 35 6 75 4 950 100 1050 50 yes yes 3 
Greece yes 10 62 1 0 0 100 1 1 9 10 100 yes yes 8 
Ireland  yes 16 100 6 50 1 90 1 1 7 9 88 yes yes 9 
Italy  yes 9 79 7 15 0 75 1 170 270 305 35 yes yes 11 
Luxembourg  no 20 84 5 10 0 100 2 11 1 12 100 yes yes 8 
Netherlands  yes 4 100 7 30 35 80 1 20 16 37 88 yes yes 8 
Portugal  yes 10 100 6 9 1 80 1 11 3 4 99 yes yes 13 
Spain  yes 20 100 6 18 0 80 1 308 62 70 85 yes yes 8 
Switzerland no 20 0 0 0 0 60 7 800 0 800 38 no no 0 
UK yes 19 100 18 50 50 40 2 15 66 80 79 yes yes 19 
ASIA 
Japan  no 4 63 2 0 0 59 10 10 0 10 - no no 0 
South Korea  no 0 0 0 0 0 100 1 - - - - no no 0 
China, PRC  no IPPs  0 0 0 0 - 2 100s 0 100s 0 yes no 5 
Indonesia  no 13, Incl. IPPs 0 0 0 0 52 1 2-4 0 2-4 100 yes - - 
Malaysia  no 9, Incl. IPPs 0 0 0 0 60 1 3 0 3 100 yes yes 7 
India yes 6 0 0 0 0 30 1 25 0 25 - yes yes 10 
Pakistan no All IPPs 0 0 0 0 100 1 9 0 9 - yes yes 11 
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No 
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R  
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R 
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dent? 
Years 
R 
exists 
SOUTH AMERICA 
Argentina yes 16 100 14 0 0 30 7 28 0 28 - yes yes 15 
Bolivia yes 14 - 0 0 0 58 3 6 0 6 - yes yes 14 
Brazil  yes - 0 0 0 0 - 1 64 0 64 - yes semi 12 
Chile  yes 20 100 - 0 0 70 4 20 0 20 - yes yes 26 
Peru yes 12 45 10 0 0 35 1 12 0 12 - yes yes 14 
Venezuela  no 0 0 0 0 0 94 1 - 0 - 73 yes no 20 
Mexico  no 7 yr, most IPPs 0 0 0 0 98 1 13 0 13 - yes no - 
AFRICA 
Ethiopia  no all IPPs 0 0 0 0 100 1 1 0 1 100 no no 0 
Kenya  yes all IPPs 0 0 0 0 92 1 1 0 1 100 yes yes 8 
Tanzania yes IPPs 0 0 0 0 - 1 1 0 1 100 no no 0 
Uganda  yes 6 yr, incl.IPPs 0 0 0 0 - 1 1 0 1 100 yes semi 8 
Ghana  yes all IPPs 0 0 0 0 - 1 2 0 2 100 yes yes 11 
Nigeria yes all IPPs 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - yes yes 3 
South Africa  yes all IPPs 0 0 0 0 >95 1 191 0 191 >50 yes yes 13 
Namibia  yes 8 0 0 0 0 100 1 5 0 1 100 yes semi 7 
Zambia  no 8 0 0 0 0 100 1 1 0 1 100 yes semi 13 
MIDDLE EAST 
Egypt  no all IPPs 0 0 0 0 100 1 8 0 8 - yes yes 8 
Israel  no 0 0 0 0 0 100 1 1 0 1 100 yes - - 
Qatar  no 4 yr, all IPPs 0 0 0 0 100 1 1 0 1 100 no no 0 
Saudi Arabia no 0 0 0 0 0 94 1 1 0 1 100 yes yes 7 
Morocco  no all IPPs 0 0 0 0 100 1 15 0 15 - no no 0 
Turkey  yes 3 0 0 0 0 >95 1 9 0 9 100 yes yes 7 
Source: ABS (2006)   
Gs= Generating companies,    DNOs: Distribution Network Operators,  Ss: Supplier companies,   Ts: Companies in Transmission,     
R: Regulator,     IPPs: Independent power producers 
